On September 28, 2000, a significant moment in European monetary history occurred when the Danish electorate voted against adopting the euro. A decisive 53.2% of Danish voters rejected participation in the third stage of the EU Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the euro single currency. This decision came despite strong recommendations for a “yes” vote from most social partner organizations. While trade union leaders largely supported euro adoption, reflecting a pro-euro stance from leadership, many union members at the grassroots level voted “no,” highlighting a division within the labor movement itself on the issue of the Danish Euro.
Denmark’s unique position regarding the euro dates back to the complexities surrounding the Maastricht Treaty ratification in 1992-93. During these negotiations, Denmark secured an opt-out clause, exempting it from the third stage of EMU and the introduction of the euro, which was launched on January 1, 1999. The 2000 referendum was specifically called to address this opt-out and gauge public sentiment on reversing it and embracing the Danish euro. However, the referendum ultimately reinforced Denmark’s continued non-participation in the eurozone with a clear, though not overwhelming, majority. The referendum saw a high voter turnout of 88.1%, mirroring previous EU-related referendums in Denmark, with 53.2% voting “no” and 46.8% voting “yes” to joining the euro.
This result underscored a recurring theme in Danish referendums on EU matters since joining the European Community in 1972: a near-equal split in the Danish population regarding EU integration. Interestingly, voting patterns didn’t strictly adhere to party lines. Had the vote aligned with the positions of Danish political parties in parliament, the “yes” camp would have likely secured approximately 80% of the vote, leaving only 20% for the “no” side. This divergence between political and public opinion is crucial in understanding Denmark’s relationship with the Danish euro and the broader EU project.
Leading up to the referendum, a broad coalition of social partner organizations actively campaigned for a “yes” vote, urging their members to support the Danish euro. The Confederation of Danish Trade Unions (LO) notably deployed a campaign bus across the country in the weeks leading up to the vote. The Danish Employers’ Confederation (DA) also intensified its public advocacy for euro adoption. Despite these concerted efforts from both labor and employer organizations, the referendum outcome demonstrated a disconnect between organizational leadership and rank-and-file members. The result indicated that a segment of trade union members, for example, were more swayed by figures like Pia Kjærsgaard of the Danish People’s Party, a prominent euro-skeptic voice, than by the recommendations of LO president Hans Jensen. While the majority of LO’s member unions, including the executive board of the influential Union of Danish Metalworkers (Dansk Metal), had endorsed a “yes” vote, their arguments emphasizing job creation and economic benefits of the Danish euro and highlighting the “opt-out” as a disadvantage, did not fully resonate with the broader electorate.
Max Bæhring, president of CO-industri, the bargaining cartel for industry employees, expressed the widespread disappointment within the “yes” camp. “We have reached out to more than 1,000 enterprises all over the country, but in spite of an active campaign this has not been enough,” Bæhring stated, lamenting the voters’ rejection of the common currency. He recognized the implications of Denmark being “on the sidelines” as the euro was set to be introduced in 11 eurozone countries on January 1, 2002. CO-industri, along with the Confederation of Danish Industries (DI), had jointly campaigned to highlight the euro’s importance for Danish businesses and employment. The unusual consensus between employers and unions in favor of the Danish euro, ironically, seemed to fuel suspicion among some rank-and-file voters. Bæhring emphasized the need to mitigate the negative consequences for Danish competitiveness and employment resulting from remaining outside the euro system, striving to safeguard the Danish welfare society.
Similar sentiments of disappointment echoed across the “yes” camp. LO president Hans Jensen called upon the government to maintain a stable economic policy to foster investment and employment. Acknowledging the “no” vote from many within LO’s membership, Jensen conceded the difficulty in communicating the complexities of the European project to the public. He stressed the importance of engaging in constructive dialogue with “no” voters to prevent the “no” vote from evolving into broader opposition to European cooperation, warning against disastrous consequences if Denmark were to retreat from EU engagement. Jensen believed that only a small minority actually desired Denmark to leave the European Union altogether.
Reflecting the traditional low-profile approach of the DA, Dansk Industri (DI) director general Hans Skov Christensen voiced concerns about the diminished competitiveness of Danish enterprises due to the rejection of the euro. He underscored the critical need to maintain the fixed exchange rate between the Danish krone and the euro. Christensen also urged against new financial burdens on trade and industry in the upcoming finance bill discussions in parliament, signaling a pragmatic shift towards damage control and adapting to the reality of Denmark remaining outside the Danish euro system.
Christensen’s concluding remark signaled a return to “business as usual” in Denmark post-referendum. Despite the setback for euro proponents, there was a sense of recalibration and resilience. While acknowledging the defeat, neither the government nor social partners anticipated an immediate push for a new referendum on the Danish euro. However, the possibility of future reconsideration remained open, with “yes” supporters hoping that evolving European dynamics might eventually shift Danish public opinion in favor of adopting the Danish euro. As Christensen concluded, the euro issue was “dead for a time,” but future European developments could potentially lead to a change in Danish attitudes.
