The surging global appetite for seafood has propelled distant-water fishing fleets (DWFs) from nations like those in the European Union and China towards resource-rich regions far from their home waters. West Africa, with its productive marine ecosystems, has become a focal point for these international fishing operations. This article delves into a comparative analysis of the fishing access agreements forged between West African countries and both the European Union (representing ‘euros’) and China (representing ‘yuan’), scrutinizing their performance in crucial areas such as illegal fishing, economic fairness, and exploitation patterns.
Fishing Opportunities off West Africa: A Magnet for Distant Fleets
1. Study Area: Defining West Africa’s Fishing Hotspot
West Africa, in this context, encompasses the vast coastal and oceanic expanse stretching from the Strait of Gibraltar to Namibia’s southern reaches, specifically excluding South Africa. This area aligns with FAO statistical zones 34 and 47, encompassing a diverse array of nations including Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, and Angola, among others (refer to Fig. 1). This region’s significance in global fisheries is underscored by its high marine productivity, fueled by major ocean currents like the Canary, Guinea, and Benguela. These currents create nutrient-rich upwelling systems, fostering abundant fish stocks that have long attracted international attention.
Fig 1. Exclusive Economic Zone waters of the West African countries considered here, also showing the 2000–2010 average annual catch and landed value of their marine fisheries, incl. distant-water fleets.
2. Foreign Access to Offshore Resources: Why West Africa?
Several factors converge to make West Africa an attractive destination for foreign fishing fleets. The region’s rich marine life, coupled with the limited capacity of local fleets to fully exploit offshore resources, creates a perceived ‘surplus’. Simultaneously, dwindling fish stocks in their own waters and escalating global seafood demand drive nations like those in the EU and China to seek fishing opportunities further afield. For decades, West Africa has been targeted through both formal fishing agreements and, problematically, illegal fishing activities.
Fishing agreements, in this context, grant foreign entities the right to access marine resources within a host country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in exchange for financial compensation. These agreements can take various forms:
- Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements: Deals between a host government and intergovernmental organizations like the EU, exemplified by Fishing Partnership Agreements (FPAs).
- Government-to-Government Agreements: Direct agreements between the host government and the government of a DWF flag-country.
- Joint Venture Agreements: Private agreements between companies and host governments, sometimes referred to as ‘second generation agreements’. These can be less transparent and involve complex arrangements like vessel chartering or re-flagging.
Notably, re-flagging, where foreign vessels are registered under the flag of a West African nation, is a common practice. For instance, a significant portion of the industrial fleets in Mauritania and Senegal are composed of Chinese-Mauritanian and EU-reflagged vessels, respectively. The sheer scale of foreign involvement is evident in figures indicating over a thousand industrial fishing vessels operating in the West African sub-region alone, with a substantial portion originating from the EU, China, and South Korea. It’s estimated that catches from West Africa contribute roughly 25% of the total fish caught by European countries, highlighting the region’s importance to EU fisheries.
However, the balance of power in these agreements is often skewed. West African nations, often facing economic vulnerabilities, may lack the bargaining leverage to ensure equitable sharing of benefits derived from their marine resources. Furthermore, many struggle with adequate resources for monitoring and enforcement, despite improvements in some nations. While agreements typically stipulate conditions such as catch offloading in local ports, catch reporting, and compensation payments, the focus often remains on access in exchange for fees, with less emphasis on resource sustainability, human rights, or governance within the host country. This is particularly true when nations are heavily reliant on access payments for foreign currency, potentially overlooking crucial factors like resource health and ethical considerations.
3. Importance and Impacts of Fishing on Local Communities: A Double-Edged Sword
Fisheries play a vital role in West African economies, often contributing over 20% to the primary sector. Beyond direct economic contributions, the sector provides livelihoods that enable access to essential staples. As climate change intensifies, with increasing droughts, coastal communities are increasingly reliant on fisheries as an alternative to agriculture and pastoralism, amplifying domestic fishing pressures.
However, this dependence is precarious. Fish stocks are vulnerable to climate change, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, where food security is deeply intertwined with fish availability. Overexploitation of fish stocks, driven by both foreign and domestic fishing, coupled with a focus on high-value species for export, poses a significant threat to local food security. The increasing export of fish to markets like Europe can limit the variety available for local consumption, often leaving communities reliant on smaller pelagic species whose populations are highly susceptible to climate fluctuations. This creates a concerning scenario where declining fish stocks, exacerbated by foreign fishing, further diminish regional and domestic fish supplies.
4. Value of West African Fisheries to EU and Chinese Distant Water Fleets: Economic Drivers
Understanding the landed value of catches is crucial for analyzing fisheries policy and international trade. This value directly influences the behavior of heavily subsidized DWFs. Subsidies, often provided by public entities, can include payments for access to foreign fisheries, creating a significant incentive for DWFs. The EU provides such subsidies through bilateral access agreement fees, while China often utilizes government development aid for similar purposes. It’s estimated that China’s annual global DWF subsidies are slightly lower than those of the EU, but both are substantial.
Given the increasing foreign fishing capacity, compensation for access to West African fisheries might be expected to be high, reflecting the significant landed value in international markets. However, local West African governments often struggle to leverage these resources for domestic food security or poverty reduction strategies, particularly when faced with intense competition from DWFs and issues of underreported catches. The compensation received by West African nations under access agreements is often opaque, and the terms can be confidential, except for EU FPAs. Even EU FPAs have been criticized for imbalances in compensation and issues related to overcapacity and reporting.
The ‘value’ of catches taken by foreign fleets is typically considered only at its ex-vessel value, neglecting potential value-added contributions from processing and marketing within host countries. Furthermore, the limited capacity of host nations to monitor DWF activities and enforce agreement conditions hinders their ability to benefit fully from these agreements, which should ideally foster local development. Underreporting of catches by foreign fleets further exacerbates this issue, as financial compensation for access agreements or joint ventures then fails to reflect the true landed value of catches taken from West African resources. This raises critical questions about international accountability for underreporting and illegal fishing.
5. Objective of the Study: Euros vs. Yuan in West African Waters
This study aims to evaluate and compare EU-West Africa and China-West Africa fishing agreements, specifically focusing on the compensation West African countries receive from each. The research investigates the reliability of catch data reported by the EU and China by comparing official figures to reconstructed catch data from comprehensive literature reviews. The overall landed value of catches by Chinese and EU fleets in West Africa is estimated. Addressing prevalent negative perceptions in Europe regarding China’s growing involvement in Africa, the study conducts a country-by-country analysis to compare the performance of EU FPAs versus Chinese agreements across several key metrics:
- Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing: Assessing the extent of illicit fishing activities associated with each.
- Amount of Compensation: Quantifying and comparing the financial returns to West African nations.
- Patterns of Exploitation of Resource Use: Examining the sustainability and resource management aspects of each type of agreement.
Material and Methods: Reconstructing Catches and Valuing Agreements
1. Catches of the EU and China: Reconstructing Reality
The study utilized a bottom-up catch reconstruction approach to estimate industrial foreign catch data within the EEZs of West African countries from 1950 to 2010 (excluding Cameroon and Namibia in certain periods). This method addresses the limitations of official data by challenging the assumption of zero catch for fisheries known to exist but not officially recorded. It acknowledges that even illegal fishing operations must generate sufficient returns to cover operational costs, providing a basis for estimating minimum catch levels. Reconstructed catches encompass both legal (but unreported) and illegal (and unreported) components from various international fleets. Legal catches are defined broadly as those obtained under legal agreements, regardless of adherence to all host country regulations, recognizing that some violations might be regulatory rather than international crimes.
To compare reconstructed data with official reports, the study employed a catch data allocation method developed by the Sea Around Us project. This approach distributes reported catches within broad FAO statistical areas to specific EEZs, enabling a more geographically refined analysis. While this method assumes proportionality between reported and unreported catches, it provides valuable insights into catch distributions across EEZs. Namibia was excluded as its catches were considered domestic post-independence. The reconstructed catch data were then compared to official reported catches to assess the performance of EU and China agreements.
2. Landed Value of West African Fisheries: Economic Quantification
Landed value was calculated as the product of average ex-vessel prices and landings (including reported, unreported, and illegal catches), utilizing West African ex-vessel fish prices. This approach likely underestimates the true potential value, as it doesn’t account for discards, which often include marketable species in West African markets. By-catch landed by DWFs flagged to West African countries was included in the analysis.
Ex-vessel prices (in 2005 USD per tonne) were sourced from existing research and adjusted to 2013 USD using the World Bank’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) to account for inflation. Using regional ex-vessel prices allows for a more consistent comparison of landed values across different foreign fleets, irrespective of international market price fluctuations. The landed value was determined by multiplying the average 2013 USD ex-vessel prices by the reconstructed catch for each EEZ, separately for EU and Chinese catches.
3. Agreement Value and Landed Value: Comparing Euros and Yuan
To compare the financial compensation provided by the EU and China relative to the landed value of catches, the study derived the average annual amounts received by each West African country for access to their fisheries, focusing on 2010 or the most recent agreement prior to that year.
Data on European FPAs, including payments (license fees and other fees in Euros), were obtained from the European Union law database (http://eur-lex.europa.eu). These amounts were converted to USD using 2010 exchange rates and further adjusted to 2013 USD using the CPI. The analysis focused on fees explicitly linked to fishing access within the agreements.
In contrast to EU FPAs, Chinese-West African agreements often involve joint ventures and re-flagged vessels, even when agreements are government-led. The study focused on intergovernmental agreements, excluding company-level deals. While some China-West Africa agreements are documented, the financial details are often confidential, expressed as ‘project values’ (e.g., infrastructure projects) rather than direct monetary compensation. The value of these projects was considered the agreement value when direct evidence linked the project to fishing access, distinguishing it from broader aid packages. Project values were assessed based on media reports and economic news. One transparent example was a $150 million USD payment by China to Morocco over 14 years for fishing access and joint ventures. However, fees paid to Mauritania, for instance, were less transparent, except for a recent agreement of $100 million USD over 25 years. The inherent lack of transparency in Chinese fisheries agreements presents a potential bias.
The study compared the financial compensation paid by the EU and China to both the landed value of reported catches (‘official compensation rate’) and the total landed value based on reconstructed catches (‘actual compensation rate’). The difference between these rates was considered the minimum economic loss for West African nations. This analysis was restricted to countries with agreements with both the EU and China where agreement values were documentable. In the absence of agreements, catches (outside of joint ventures or re-flagged fleets) and their value were considered illegal. This framework allowed for quantifying the proportion of landed value covered by fishing agreements from both Europe and China.
Results: Unveiling Catch Discrepancies and Compensation Gaps
1. Catches by Europe and China: A Tale of Two Fleets
The bottom-up estimation of Chinese catches in West Africa averaged 2.3 million tonnes per year between 2000 and 2010. This figure aligns reasonably well with previous estimates, lending credibility to the reconstruction methodology.
The analysis revealed significant underreporting by China. Of the estimated 2.3 million tonnes, only 8% was officially reported by China to the FAO. The majority was categorized as legally caught but unreported (1.4 million tonnes), illegal/unregulated and unreported (761,000 tonnes), and catches reported as domestic catches by West African fleets but beneficially owned by China (159,000 tonnes). Underreporting by China’s legal fleet was most pronounced in the 1980s, early in their DWF operations in West Africa, but decreased over time, potentially as re-flagging practices increased. However, total legal catches were still estimated to be 11 times higher than reported catches between 2000 and 2010. Illegal catches by Chinese fleets were estimated to have increased over time, reaching an average of 761,000 tonnes per year during 2000-2010 (Fig. 2).
Fig 2. Total catches by Chinese and EU fleets from the waters of West Africa, 1950–2010.
Sierra Lone claimed its EEZ in 1971, Morocco in 1981, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon in 1984, Congo (ex-Zaire) in 1992 and Cameroon in 2000. The 16 other West African countries claimed their EEZ between 1976 and 1980, and hence the location of the transition zone (shaded) from ‘unregulated; to ‘illegal’ catches in the lower panel.
EU fleets, historically dominant in the region, showed a different trend. Legal EU catches peaked at 3.5 million tonnes in the mid-1970s and declined to an average of 1.8 million tonnes per year between 2000 and 2010. Of this, only 30% was officially reported to the FAO. Illegal/unregulated EU catches peaked in the 1970s and decreased to an average of 224,000 tonnes per year during 2000-2010 (Fig. 2). While EU catches have decreased, the data suggests a potential increase in underreporting by the EU over time.
The contrasting trends – declining EU catches and increasing Chinese catches – might suggest a shift in dominance. However, the decrease in reported EU catches could also be linked to increased re-flagging of EU vessels to West African nations. While Chinese re-flagging practices are more readily apparent, the complex post-colonial relationships between EU member states and some West African countries make it harder to distinguish between EU-re-flagged fleets and genuinely domestic fleets.
2. Landed Value of West African Fisheries: Billions at Stake
Between 2000 and 2010, the estimated landed value of catches taken by EU and Chinese fleets in West Africa totaled a staggering $8.3 billion USD. Chinese fleets accounted for $4.7 billion USD, exceeding the EU’s $3.7 billion USD. A significant portion of this value, and the corresponding catch volume, originated from Moroccan waters, particularly the former Spanish Sahara (68%).
Illegal fishing constituted a considerable portion of the total value. While only 4% of the EU’s landed value ($0.2 billion USD) was attributed to illegal catches, a much larger 40% of China’s landed value ($1.7 billion USD) was deemed illegal. Legal EU fishing activities were concentrated in the waters of Morocco, Mauritania, Cape Verde, and Guinea, while illegal EU fishing was more prominent off Mauritania, Senegal, and Liberia. Similarly, legal Chinese fishing value was primarily derived from Morocco (including Western Sahara), Mauritania, Angola, Cape Verde, and Congo (Brazzaville). Illegal Chinese fishing activities appeared concentrated around Morocco, Nigeria, and, to a lesser extent, Mauritania.
3. Agreements Value and Landed Value: A Compensation Imbalance
European Fishing Agreements and Equity:
The EU paid an average of $307 million USD per year for access to West African waters between 2000 and 2010 (Table 3). Morocco and Mauritania received the largest shares of these access fees, followed by Senegal and Angola. The ‘official compensation rate’, calculated as the ratio of access value to the value of reported landings, was estimated at 26%. This suggests the EU returns about a quarter of the value it reports taking from West Africa, which appears relatively high, especially in Mauritania’s case, where it reaches 100% of reported landed value.
However, the ‘actual compensation rate’, calculated against the total landed value (including illegal catches), paints a different picture. This rate drops to an average of just 8% (Table 3). This figure ranges from 0% in countries without agreements but with documented catches (Benin, Sierra Leone, Togo, Liberia, Ghana) to a maximum of 23% in Mauritania.
Even with substantial payments to Morocco ($180 million USD), this represents only 7% of the actual landed value of total catches. Regional disparities are evident; Morocco, contributing 28% of total catches, receives 59% of agreement fees, while Mauritania, with a larger share of catches (one-third), receives only 30% of fees. This translates to the EU paying approximately $345 USD per tonne of catch from Moroccan waters compared to $154 USD per tonne from Mauritanian waters.
Chinese Fishing Agreements and Equity:
Estimating access fees paid by China required extensive research due to the limited transparency of Chinese agreements. The study utilized media and news reports to assess project values associated with fishing access. Despite these efforts, not all Chinese payments could be identified, and separating fisheries-related components from broader aid packages proved challenging.
Chinese agreements were estimated to provide $166 million USD per year in access fees between 2000 and 2010 (Table 3). However, the ‘official compensation rate’ based on reported catches was estimated at 40%, higher than the EU’s. Yet, the ‘actual compensation rate’, accounting for reconstructed catches and adjusting for undocumented access fees, fell to just 4% (Table 3). This ‘actual compensation rate’ for China is half that of the EU (8%).
Regional variations are also significant. While agreements with Morocco constituted only 5% of the total Chinese agreement value, catches from Moroccan waters represented 26%. This translates to a compensation rate of approximately $15 USD per tonne from Moroccan waters, compared to $121 USD per tonne paid to Mauritania.
Applying more stringent criteria to exclude projects potentially not solely related to fisheries further reduces the estimated Chinese compensation rate to 3%.
Despite the observed differences in average compensation rates, the substantial variance around these means suggests they are not statistically significantly different.
Table 3. Estimated average landed value, access value, official and actual compensation by Europe and China from West African countries for the period between 2000 and 2010, in 2013 USD x 106.
Discussion: Towards Fairer and Sustainable Fishing in West Africa
This study reveals a concerning trend of increasing underreporting of catches by the EU in West African waters, while Chinese underreporting, although historically higher, may be showing signs of decline. This potential decrease in Chinese underreporting might be linked to the increasing re-flagging of Chinese fleets, which, ironically, could lead to lower compensation rates as “domestic vessels” typically pay reduced fees.
Underreporting has direct detrimental impacts on local economies and resource sustainability by masking overfishing. For example, EU fleets increased catches from Morocco and Western Sahara by 5% after 1995, despite agreements to reduce quotas by 40%. Foreign fleets, by jeopardizing long-term stock sustainability, hinder the development of domestic fisheries. This has prompted nations like Mauritania to exclude valuable species like octopus from EU agreements, yet these resources are often still exploited by re-flagged vessels, blurring the lines of true domestic fishing. Furthermore, undervalued catches, coupled with weak negotiating power and opaque agreement processes, lead to significant financial discrepancies, especially in the case of China, where re-flagging further minimizes license fees.
The estimated $8.4 billion USD annual landed value of catches by EU and Chinese fleets in West Africa excludes value-added activities like processing and marketing, which could inflate this figure by approximately 40%. This would raise the annual value to around $11.8 billion USD, comparable to the total net development assistance received by West African countries from all sources. The gap between these landed values and the compensation received highlights a significant economic loss for African nations. The estimated $0.5 billion USD in earnings by West African governments from access fees represents a mere 6% of this expanded value, excluding the potential from local landing, processing, and employment.
Beyond direct financial losses, other factors exacerbate the situation. Bribery by foreign companies seeking access can fuel corruption and human rights abuses, particularly in resource-dependent nations. While UNCLOS allows for fishing agreements based on ‘surplus’ catch, concerns arise when total catches, including unreported components, exceed sustainable levels. Furthermore, UNCLOS mandates that fishing agreements should not undermine local development and livelihoods, a principle often overlooked in practice.
While Chinese project-based compensation might appear strategically advantageous in corruption-prone environments by funding tangible infrastructure projects rather than easily misappropriated cash, the study indicates that the actual compensation rates are lower than those of the EU. However, the significant variability in compensation rates makes it statistically difficult to differentiate between EU and Chinese performance in this regard. Both EU and Chinese fishing agreements have demonstrably negative impacts on food security in host countries.
The pattern of relatively low compensation paid by Europe for fisheries resources in developing nations, as confirmed by this study, has been documented in other regions. While the estimated 8% actual compensation rate for the EU in West Africa is higher than some previous estimates, it still highlights a substantial imbalance. Although Chinese project-based compensation could be seen as more impactful in certain contexts, the lower overall compensation rates, potentially linked to higher underreporting and incomplete accounting of agreement values, remain a concern. However, regional variations exist where China provides higher compensation rates than the EU, making overall rates statistically comparable. Nevertheless, this study suggests that both EU and Chinese compensation rates are generally low.
While Chinese agreements may present a strategic approach to economic development, they often lack dedicated financial contributions for monitoring, surveillance, and scientific research, essential components for sustainable fisheries management. The EU, while emphasizing monitoring and surveillance in its agreements, appears to underfund these crucial activities, as evidenced by the persistent presence of illegal vessels, including EU-flagged ones, in West African EEZs. Furthermore, EU fleet owners, like many foreign operators, often deny host country observers onboard, hindering effective monitoring. The absence of robust monitoring and surveillance mechanisms contributes to the prevalence of illegal fishing activities. While Chinese fleets are increasingly implicated in IUU fishing in West Africa, EU operators also bear responsibility for significant illegal catches.
To improve fairness, equity, and sustainability, several recommendations emerge:
- “Monitoring the Monitor”: Implement mechanisms to ensure that monitoring fees are used effectively and transparently for their intended purpose.
- Increased Transparency: Enhance the transparency of fishing agreements and intergovernmental communications to foster competition among DWF nations, potentially driving up access fees and improving the negotiating position of West African countries.
- Regional Agreements: Negotiate regional agreements to strengthen the collective bargaining power of West African nations, potentially leading to better terms and greater sustainability.
- Regional Regulatory Responsibilities: West African nations must actively exercise regulatory responsibilities at a regional level, enforcing existing agreements like the right of pursuit to combat IUU fishing.
- Registry of Reflagged Vessels: Establish a publicly accessible registry of re-flagged and flag-of-convenience vessels to enhance transparency and accountability.
- Improved Resource Allocation Measures: Replace ineffective GRT-based resource allocation criteria with more appropriate measures like species quota allocation.
- Dedicated Funding: Clearly earmark funds within fishing access agreements to support the establishment and enforcement of effective resource allocation criteria, scientific research, and training.
- Responsible DWF Behavior: Both the EU and China must act more responsibly regarding fisheries they engage in within West Africa. Sanctions should be imposed on vessels denying observer access or exceeding quotas.
- Capacity Building: Prioritize capacity building in African countries, particularly to strengthen local monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) capabilities.
- Prioritize Local Benefits: African nations should prioritize access to operators who offload catches in local ports, fostering value-added processing and marketing activities within their economies.
This study acknowledges limitations, including the inherent opacity of Chinese fishing agreements and the challenge of fully disentangling economic and political factors influencing agreement negotiations. Some Chinese access fees might have been underestimated due to difficulties in separating fisheries-specific components and potential bribes. Further research is needed to delve deeper into these aspects, compare non-monetary dimensions of agreements (support for MCS, research, sustainability clauses), and refine the assessment of compensation values. Despite these limitations, this study provides valuable insights into the complex dynamics of EU and Chinese fishing agreements in West Africa, highlighting critical areas for improvement towards more equitable and sustainable fisheries management.
Supporting Information
S1 Materials. Materials and methods for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000–2010.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118351.s001
(DOCX)
S1 References. Other references used in S1 Table for the assessment of the fees paid by China for access to the EEZs of West African countries.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118351.s002
(DOCX)
S1 Results and Discussion. Results and main findings summarized from the assessment presented in S1 Table.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118351.s003
(DOCX)
S1 Table. Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000–2010.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118351.s004
(DOCX)
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the MAVA Foundation through the “Marine Conservation Research, Collaboration and Support in West Africa” project and by The Pew Charitable Trusts and the Paul G. Allen Family Foundation through the Sea Around Us initiative at the University of British Columbia. We extend our gratitude to Frederic Le Manach and Dr. Wilf Swartz for their insightful feedback on the initial draft. We also thank colleagues from African institutions who preferred to remain anonymous and Dr. Francis K.E. Nunoo for his valuable input.
Author Contributions
DB and VWYL conceived and designed the study. DB performed the experiments and analyzed the data. DZ, URS, PLB, EAK, and DP contributed reagents, materials, and analysis tools. DB and DP co-authored the manuscript.
