Introduction
The escalating global demand for seafood, particularly in Europe and Asia, coupled with the depletion of local fish stocks, has significantly fueled the expansion of heavily subsidized distant-water fleets (DWF) from Europe and Northeast Asia into the developing world. Over 70% of the seafood consumed in the European Union (EU) is now imported from regions outside EU waters, predominantly from developing nations. A similar trend is observed in Japan and likely in China as well.
Limited financial and technical resources in developing countries often impede effective monitoring, control, and enforcement of industrial foreign fishing activities. This deficiency contributes to overfishing and the pervasive issues of under-reported and unsustainable catches. Catch data provided by DWFs are often unreliable in regions with weak monitoring and surveillance capacities, leading to substantial discrepancies between reported statistics and the actual situation.
While a few developing nations, such as Ghana and Thailand, have managed to develop their own offshore fishing capabilities, most are constrained to offering access to their ‘surplus’ catch—the difference between the maximum sustainable yield and domestic landings—to foreign countries. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) encourages countries to grant access to this surplus through fishing agreements. However, economically vulnerable nations often prioritize short-term financial gains from access fees over sustainable catch quotas, thereby underestimating the long-term economic benefits of domestic processing and marketing.
The assertion that “there are no data” to determine sustainable catch levels is often a misconception. The real challenge lies in the lack of support for scientists who can effectively analyze available data on catch, fishing effort, and economic factors. This study aims to demonstrate that sufficient data exist for European and Chinese distant-water fisheries in West Africa to make informed comparisons of their catches, economic value, and the fees paid for fishing access. This analysis seeks to estimate and compare the fees paid by the EU and China for access to West African fisheries, while also examining their reporting practices, the landed value of their catches, and involvement in illegal fishing activities.
Fishing Opportunities off West Africa
1. Study Area
West Africa, as defined in this study, encompasses the region from the Strait of Gibraltar (36° 8′ N) to the southern tip of Namibia (17°15’S), excluding South Africa. This area falls within FAO statistical areas 34 (Eastern Central Atlantic) and 47 (South Eastern Atlantic) and includes countries from Morocco to Namibia. Foreign catch data from Namibian waters primarily includes EU catches before the early 2000s.
2. Foreign Access to Offshore Resources
West Africa’s rich marine productivity, driven by the Canary, Guinea, and Benguela Current upwelling systems, coupled with the inability of local fleets to exploit offshore resources and increasing global fish demand, makes the region highly attractive to foreign fishing. Developed countries have long sought access to West African waters through fishing agreements and, at times, illegal fishing.
Fishing agreements grant foreign entities the right to exploit marine resources within a host country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in exchange for financial compensation. These agreements can be bilateral or multilateral, involving host governments and organizations like the EU (Fishing Partnership Agreements – FPAs), flag-country governments, or private companies (joint ventures). Joint ventures, often termed ‘second generation agreements,’ can obscure terms and conditions and may involve vessel reflagging to the host country. For instance, a significant portion of Mauritania’s industrial fleet consists of Chinese-Mauritanian joint ventures, and Senegal’s industrial fleet includes many EU-reflagged vessels. Both EU and Chinese fleets are involved in joint ventures across West Africa. The lack of recent official data for China and the complexity of tracing EU joint ventures highlight a critical issue of transparency.
Fishing agreements for West African waters have increased dramatically over the decades, reflecting growing global fish demand. These figures exclude ‘domestic’ offshore fleets, which often include reflagged European and Chinese vessels. Industrial fishing vessels in the West African sub-region alone number over a thousand, with a significant portion being foreign vessels from the EU, China, and South Korea. Consequently, West Africa contributes a substantial portion of the fish caught by European countries.
The weak political and economic leverage of many West African countries often leads to an inequitable distribution of benefits from their fisheries resources. Many nations lack the resources to effectively monitor and enforce the conditions of these agreements, despite improvements in some countries. While EU agreements typically include requirements for catch offloading, reporting, and payments, the negotiated amounts primarily cover access to EEZs, often without adequate consideration for resource sustainability, human rights, or governance within the host country. This is especially true for countries heavily reliant on access payments for foreign exchange.
The combination of abundant resources and weak governance creates conditions ripe for unregulated and illegal foreign fishing off West Africa. Fishing access agreements offer West African countries a share of the value of their resources, which were previously freely accessible to DWFs. However, the financial compensation, developmental returns, and legality of these agreements, particularly those with the EU, are frequently questioned. Few studies have quantified the income generated under these agreements. Major players under EU-Africa agreements include France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy. Numerous other countries from Europe, Asia, and Flags of Convenience also fish extensively in West Africa.
Growing Chinese involvement in Africa has attracted considerable attention, particularly in Europe. Increasing fishing efforts by both Europe and China in the same region suggest intensifying competition for access to West African fishing grounds. In a rational market, competition for a limited resource like access to valuable fishing grounds should drive up prices. However, the varying compensation levels paid by Europe to countries like Morocco and Mauritania suggest a potentially undervalued assessment of West African fish resources despite high demand. Resource scarcity, exacerbated by illegal fishing and domestic small-scale fishing expansion, creates a negative cycle. Declining stocks push artisanal fleets offshore and industrial vessels closer to shore, sometimes encroaching on areas reserved for local fishers.
3. Importance and Impacts of Fishing on Local Communities
In West Africa, fisheries contribute over 20% to the primary sector, excluding access fees. The sector provides jobs that enable people to purchase essential staples. Climate change events, like cyclical droughts, are driving populations to coastal areas seeking alternatives to agriculture, increasing domestic fishing pressure. Fisheries themselves are vulnerable to climate change, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, where food security is heavily reliant on fish. Collapsing fisheries and low fishing incomes could trap coastal populations between failing agriculture and failing fisheries.
Overexploitation, the focus on high-value species, and export subsidies threaten food security in host countries. Increased exports to Europe limit the availability of fish for local consumption, primarily to small pelagic species whose abundance is climate-dependent. This further strains already overexploited stocks, reducing fish supply at regional and domestic levels.
4. Value of West African Fisheries to EU and Chinese Distant Water Fleets
Landed values of catches are critical for analyzing fisheries policy and foreign trade, driving the behavior of heavily subsidized DWFs. Subsidies, including fees for access to foreign fisheries, incentivize DWF activities. The EU and China provide substantial annual subsidies to their DWFs globally. Compensation for West African fisheries is expected to be low compared to the international market value of the landed catch, especially given increasing foreign fishing capacity. West African governments struggle to enhance food security or implement poverty reduction strategies amidst competition from DWFs and issues of under-reported catches. Compensation under access agreements is often opaque, except for EU FPAs, which have also been shown to be unbalanced in terms of compensation, overcapacity, and reporting. The ‘value’ of foreign catches is typically considered only at the ex-vessel level, excluding value-added contributions. Host countries’ limited monitoring capacity hinders their ability to benefit from these agreements, which should ideally promote local development. Under-reporting of catches by foreign fleets undermines the financial compensation for access and raises questions of international accountability for under-reporting and illegal fishing.
5. Objective of the Study
This study aims to compare EU-West Africa and China-West Africa fishing agreements, focusing on the compensation West African countries receive. It investigates the reliability of catch data from the EU and China by comparing official data with reconstructed catch data. The overall landed value of fisheries operated by Chinese and EU fleets in West Africa is estimated. The study further compares the EU’s performance under FPAs to Chinese agreements in terms of a) illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; b) compensation amounts; and c) resource exploitation patterns.
Materials and Methods
1. Catches of the EU and China
Industrial foreign catch data were extracted using a bottom-up catch reconstruction approach for the EEZs of West African countries (excluding Cameroon and Namibia in specific periods). These ‘reconstructed catches’ are based on the principle that even unrecorded fisheries have a minimum catch to cover operational costs. They include legal (but unreported) and illegal (and unreported) catches. ‘Legal catches’ are defined as those under legal agreements, regardless of compliance with domestic regulations.
Official (reported) catch data from FAO cover broad FAO areas, not specific EEZs. To compare reconstructed data with reported data, a catch data allocation approach was used to distribute FAO area catches to individual EEZs from 1950 to 2010. This approach assumes proportionality, meaning unreported catches correlate with reported catches. Namibia was excluded as its catches were considered domestic post-independence. Comparisons were then made between reported and reconstructed catches to assess the performance of EU and China-West Africa agreements.
2. Landed Value of West African Fisheries Operated by the EU and China
Landed value is calculated as the product of average ex-vessel prices and landings (including all catch types), using West African ex-vessel prices. This method underestimates potential value by excluding discards. By-catch landed by DWF flagged to West African countries is included.
Average ex-vessel prices (2005 USD per tonne) for 2000-2010 were obtained and adjusted to 2013 USD using the World Bank’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) to derive landed values for EU and Chinese fleets. Regional ex-vessel prices are used to allow for comparisons regardless of international market price fluctuations. Landed value is then the product of 2013 USD average ex-vessel prices and reconstructed catches per EEZ for both EU and Chinese catches.
3. Agreement Value and Landed Value: Comparing the EU and China
To compare landed catch value to compensation paid, average annual amounts received by West African countries from the EU and China were derived for 2010 or the latest agreement year before 2010.
EU FPA data, including access fees (Euro, converted to USD 2013), were sourced from the EU law database. Chinese-West African agreements often involve joint ventures and reflagged vessels, even in intergovernmental agreements. Only intergovernmental agreements, not company-level agreements, are considered.
While some China-West Africa agreements are documented, amounts are often confidential or expressed as ‘project values’ (e.g., infrastructure projects) given in exchange for fishing access. These project values are considered agreement values when direct evidence links them to fishing access. Project values were assessed via media reports and economic news. Transparency issues with Chinese agreements may introduce bias.
The study compares financial compensation from the EU and China to the landed value of reported catches (“official compensation rate”) and total landed value based on reconstructed catches (“actual compensation rate”). The difference represents the minimum economic loss for West African countries. This comparison required both EU and China to have agreements with a country and documented access fee amounts. Catches without agreements (excluding joint ventures or reflagged fleets) are considered illegal. This approach quantifies the portion of landed value covered by agreements from both Europe and China.
Results
1. Catches by Europe and China
Reconstructed Chinese catches from West Africa averaged 2.3 million t·year-1 (2000-2010), about 20% lower than a previous estimate but within its confidence interval. This estimate excludes Namibia for the 2000s, further narrowing the gap. Chinese catches included legal but unreported catches (1.4 million t·year-1), illegal unreported catches (761,000 t·year-1), FAO-reported catches (20,200 t·year-1), and catches reported as domestic but beneficially owned by China (159,000 t·year-1). Only 8% of total Chinese catches were officially reported. Under-reporting was highest in the 1980s, decreasing over time but remaining high. Illegal catches increased from 357,000 t·year-1 in the 1980s to 761,000 t·year-1 in 2000-2010.
EU legal catches in West Africa peaked at 3.5 million t·year-1 in the mid-1970s, declining to 1.8 million t·year-1 (2000-2010), with only 524,000 t·year-1 officially reported (30%). Illegal EU catches peaked in the 1970s and decreased to 224,000 t·year-1 in 2000-2010.
European legal catches were dominant before China’s major entry into West African fisheries. The decline in EU catches and increase in Chinese catches suggests a potential shift, although EU reflagging practices might also explain the decrease in reported EU foreign catches. Chinese reflagging is more easily identified, while post-colonial relationships complicate distinguishing EU-reflagged fleets from truly domestic ones.
2. Landed Value of West African Fisheries
From 2000 to 2010, EU and Chinese fleets in West Africa caught fish worth 8.3 billion USD (EU: 3.7 billion USD; China: 4.7 billion USD). Most value originated from Moroccan waters (68%). Illegal catches constituted 4% of the EU’s value (0.2 billion USD) and 40% of China’s value (1.7 billion USD). Legal EU value was primarily from Morocco, Mauritania, Cape Verde, and Guinea. Illegal EU value was mainly from Mauritania, Senegal, and Liberia. Legal Chinese value was largely from Morocco, Mauritania, Angola, Cape Verde, and Congo (Brazzaville). Illegal Chinese fishing was concentrated around Morocco, Nigeria, and Mauritania.
3. Agreements Value and Landed Value: Comparing Europe and China
European Fishing Agreements and Equity:
Europe paid an average of 307 million USD·year-1 for access to West African waters (2000-2010). Top recipients were Morocco and Mauritania, followed by Senegal and Angola. The official compensation rate (access value/reported landings value) was 26%. However, the actual compensation rate (access value/total landed value) was much lower at 8%. This ranged from 0% in countries without agreements to 23% for Mauritania.
While EU compensation to Morocco was high (180 million USD), it represented only 7% of the actual landed value. Morocco received significantly higher compensation per tonne of catch compared to Mauritania.
Chinese Fishing Agreements and Equity:
Estimated Chinese access fees averaged 166 million USD·year-1 (2000-2010). Due to transparency issues, not all Chinese payments could be identified. The official compensation rate for China was 40%, but the actual rate was 4% (adjusted for undocumented fees). China’s actual compensation rate (4%) was half of the EU’s (8%). Regional variations exist, with Morocco receiving lower compensation per tonne compared to Mauritania.
Applying stricter criteria for fisheries-related Chinese projects reduced the estimated compensation further, potentially to 3%. Overall, high variance in compensation rates for both EU and China suggests no statistically significant difference between them.
Discussion
This study indicates increasing under-reporting by the EU and potentially declining under-reporting by China, possibly due to increased reflagging of Chinese fleets. Reflagging can lead to lower compensation rates as “domestic vessels” often pay less in fees.
Under-reporting masks overfishing and negatively impacts local economies and resource sustainability. For example, EU catches from Morocco increased after a quota reduction agreement due to under-reporting. Foreign fleets undermine domestic fisheries development by threatening long-term stock sustainability. Mauritania’s exclusion of octopus from a new EU agreement, now reserved for the ‘domestic’ fishery (which includes reflagged vessels), illustrates this issue. Under-valued catches and weak bargaining power contribute to financial discrepancies, especially with China, where reflagging minimizes license fees.
The estimated 8.4 billion USD·year-1 landed value by EU and Chinese fleets, excluding value-added processes, could reach 11.8 billion USD·year-1 with added value, equivalent to the total development assistance received by West African countries. The difference between landed values and compensation represents a significant loss for African countries.
Bribing and corruption further exacerbate resource exploitation and human rights abuses. While UNCLOS supports agreements for accessing surplus catch, concerns arise when this surplus is exceeded and local development is jeopardized.
Chinese project-based compensation might be strategically advantageous in high-corruption environments. However, both EU and Chinese agreements can negatively impact food security in host countries.
The EU’s pattern of low fees for developing countries’ fisheries resources is confirmed, with our 8% actual compensation rate being relatively high compared to previous estimates. While Chinese project-based compensation might seem appealing, its lower overall value and potential under-reporting raise concerns. Regional variations show China sometimes offering higher compensation rates than the EU, making overall compensation rates statistically similar. However, both EU and Chinese compensation rates appear to be low.
Both Chinese and EU agreements contribute to overexploitation and socio-economic challenges in West Africa. Overfishing leads to stock depletion, smaller fish sizes, reduced catch per unit effort, and shifts from exporting resources to ‘importing’ depletion.
While Chinese agreements may offer economic development projects, they often lack support for monitoring, surveillance, and scientific research. The EU, while emphasizing monitoring, may underpay for these crucial activities, as evidenced by high illegal fishing rates, including by EU vessels. Observer access is often denied by foreign fleets, hindering effective monitoring. While Chinese fleets are increasingly implicated in IUU fishing, EU operators also contribute significantly to illegal catches.
Recommendations for improvement include: applying “Monitoring the Monitor” principles to ensure proper use of monitoring fees; increasing agreement transparency to foster competition and higher fees; negotiating regional agreements to enhance bargaining power; establishing a registry for reflagged and flag-of-convenience vessels; and implementing more effective resource allocation measures like species quotas. Funds from agreements should be dedicated to enforcement and scientific research.
Both the EU and China should adopt more responsible fisheries practices in West Africa, including sanctions for non-compliance and enhanced capacity building in African countries for monitoring and control. African countries should prioritize access to operators who offload catches locally to foster value-added processing and marketing.
Limitations of this study include the opacity of Chinese agreements and the difficulty in fully separating fisheries-related project values from broader aid packages, potentially underestimating Chinese compensation. Further research is needed to investigate the conditions of agreement negotiations and non-monetary aspects like support for monitoring, research, and sustainability clauses. Further investigation is needed to eliminate such bias and compare other non-monetary aspects of fishing agreements.
Supporting Information
S1 Materials. Materials and methods for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000–2010.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118351.s001
S1 References. Other references used in S1 Table for the assessment of the fees paid by China for access to the EEZs of West African countries.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118351.s002
S1 Results and Discussion. Results and main findings summarized from the assessment presented in S1 Table.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118351.s003
S1 Table. Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000–2010.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118351.s004
Acknowledgments
This work is a contribution of the Sea Around Us project, funded by the MAVA Foundation, The Pew Charitable Trusts, and the Paul G. Allen Family Foundation. We thank Frederic Le Manach and Dr. Wilf Swartz for their valuable feedback on the draft manuscript. We also acknowledge the contributions of African colleagues who wished to remain anonymous and Dr. Francis K.E. Nunoo for his insightful comments.
Author Contributions
DB, VWYL, PLB, and DP conceived and designed the study. DB performed the experiments and analyzed the data. DZ, URS, PLB, EAK, and DP contributed reagents, materials, and analysis tools. DB and DP wrote the paper.
