Introduction
The escalating global demand for seafood, particularly in Europe and Asia, coupled with the depletion of local fish stocks, has significantly fueled the expansion of heavily subsidized distant-water fleets (DWF) from Europe and Northeast Asia into the developing world. Over 70% of the seafood consumed in the European Union (EU) is now imported from outside EU waters, predominantly from developing nations. A similar pattern is observed in Japan and likely in China as well.
In many developing countries, limited financial and technical resources hinder effective monitoring, control, and enforcement of foreign industrial fishing activities. This deficiency often results in overfishing, under-reported catches, and unsustainable fishing practices. Catch data reported by DWFs in regions with weak monitoring and surveillance are often unreliable, leading to significant discrepancies between official statistics reported to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the actual situation.
While a few developing countries, such as Ghana and Thailand, have developed their own offshore fishing capacity, most are constrained to offering access to their ‘surplus’ fish stocks – the difference between the maximum sustainable yield and domestic landings. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) mandates that countries provide access to this surplus through various agreements. However, economically vulnerable nations often prioritize short-term financial gains from fishing access agreements over sustainable catch quotas. These agreements often negotiate fees based on foreign fishing capacity income rather than sustainable resource management. Consequently, governments may overlook the potential of maximum sustainable yields and realistic catch estimates to regulate foreign vessel access. Furthermore, the underestimation of domestic activities like processing and marketing further hinders local development.
The common notion that “there are no data” to determine sustainable catch levels is often a misconception. The issue is not necessarily the absence of data, but rather a lack of support for scientists to analyze existing data on catch, fishing effort, and related economic factors. This study aims to demonstrate that sufficient data are available regarding European and Chinese distant-water fisheries in West Africa to draw meaningful inferences about their catches, economic value, and the fees paid for fishing access. These are crucial elements for informed fisheries policy. This research seeks to estimate and compare the fees paid by the EU and China for access to West African fisheries, while also comparing their reporting practices, the landed value of their catches, and their involvement in illegal fishing activities.
Fishing Opportunities off West Africa
1. Study Area
West Africa, for the purpose of this study, encompasses the region from the Strait of Gibraltar (36° 8′ N) to the southern tip of Namibia (17°15’S), excluding South Africa. This area falls within FAO statistical areas 34 (Eastern Central Atlantic) and 47 (South Eastern Atlantic) and includes countries from Morocco to Namibia (Figure 1). Data from Namibian waters primarily includes EU catches prior to the early 2000s.
2. Foreign Access to Offshore Resources
West Africa’s high marine productivity, driven by the Canary, Guinea, and Benguela Current upwelling systems, combined with local fleets’ limited offshore capabilities, depleted global fish stocks, and rising global fish demand, makes the region highly attractive to foreign fishing. West Africa has long been targeted by developed nations through fishing agreements and illegal fishing.
Fishing agreements grant access to a host country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in exchange for financial compensation. These agreements can be bilateral or multilateral, involving: (a) host governments and inter-governmental organizations like the EU (Fishing Partnership Agreements – FPAs); (b) host governments and DWF flag-country governments; and (c) companies and host governments (joint venture agreements). Joint ventures, often opaque, may involve vessel chartering or temporary transfers, effectively reflagging industrial fleets to the host country. For example, many Mauritanian and Senegalese industrial fleets are comprised of Chinese-Mauritanian and EU-reflagged joint ventures, respectively. EU fleets, similar to China, engage in numerous joint ventures in West African countries. The lack of recent official data for China and the difficulty in tracking EU joint ventures highlights a significant transparency issue.
Fishing agreements for West African waters have surged due to global fish demand, from 36 in the 1960s to over 300 by the early 2000s, excluding ‘domestic’ offshore fleets, which often include reflagged European and Chinese vessels. Industrial fishing vessels in the West African Sub-Region alone exceed a thousand, with 700 foreign vessels from the EU, China, and South Korea. Consequently, West African catches contribute about 25% of European countries’ total fish catch.
The weak political and economic leverage of many West African countries often leads to inequitable distribution of benefits from their fisheries resources between host nations and DWF countries. Despite improvements in monitoring and enforcement in some West African nations, many still lack the resources to effectively oversee access agreement conditions. EU agreements typically include stipulations for catch offloading in host ports, catch reporting, payments for extra capacity, and negotiated access fees. However, compensation often focuses solely on access to EEZ resources, disregarding resource sustainability, human rights, or governance within the host country. This is especially true for countries heavily reliant on access payments for foreign exchange, even amidst human rights concerns and overexploited resources.
Abundant resources, weak monitoring, and governance issues create ideal conditions for unregulated and illegal foreign fishing off West Africa. Fishing access agreements were intended to capture some value from resources previously freely accessible to DWFs. However, the financial compensation, developmental returns, and legality of EU agreements have been questioned. Few studies have quantified income generated under these agreements. France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy are primary actors under EU-Africa agreements. Other European, Asian, and Flag of Convenience (FoC) countries also fish extensively in West Africa (Table 1).
Growing Chinese engagement in Africa has attracted significant European attention. Increased fishing effort by both Europe and China in the same region suggests growing competition for West African fishing grounds. In a rational market, competition for a scarce, high-demand resource should drive up prices. However, the varying compensation paid by Europe to countries like Morocco and Mauritania suggests an undervaluation of highly demanded West African fish resources. Simultaneously, resource scarcity, exacerbated by illegal foreign fishing and expanding domestic small-scale fishing, creates a cycle of declining stocks. This pushes artisanal fleets offshore and industrial vessels into near-shore waters, often encroaching on areas reserved for local fishers.
3. Importance and Impacts of Fishing on Local Communities
Fisheries contribute over 20% of the primary sector in West Africa (excluding access fees). The sector provides jobs enabling people to purchase essential staples. Climate events like droughts drive populations to coastal areas seeking alternatives to agriculture and pastoralism, increasing domestic fishing pressure. However, fisheries are vulnerable to climate change, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where food security is highly dependent on fish. Collapsing fisheries and low fishing incomes may trap coastal populations between failing agriculture and failing fisheries.
Overexploitation, the focus on high-value species, and export subsidies threaten domestic food security in host countries. Increased exports to Europe limit the availability of fish for local consumption to climate-sensitive small pelagic species. This intensifies pressure on already overfished stocks and reduces fish supply regionally and domestically.
4. Value of West African Fisheries to EU and Chinese Distant Water Fleets
Landed values are crucial for analyzing fisheries policy and foreign trade, as they drive the behavior of subsidized DWFs. Subsidies, including fees for foreign fishing access (capacity-enhancing subsidies), incentivize DWF activities. The EU and China provide substantial annual subsidies to their DWFs globally. Compensation for West African fisheries is expected to be low, while the landed value on the international market is more significant due to increasing foreign fishing capacity. West African governments struggle to enhance food security or reduce poverty amid DWF competition and under-reported catches. Compensation from access agreements is often opaque, except for EU FPAs, which have been shown to be unbalanced in compensation, overcapacity, and reporting. The ‘value’ of foreign catches is typically considered only ex-vessel value, excluding value-added contributions. Host countries’ limited monitoring and enforcement capacity hinders their benefits from agreements aimed at local development. Under-reported catches further distort financial compensation for access agreements and joint ventures, raising accountability questions at the international level.
5. Objective of the Study
This study evaluates and compares EU-West Africa and China-West Africa fishing agreements, focusing on compensation to West African countries. It investigates the reliability of EU and China catch data by comparing official data to reconstructed catch estimates. The overall landed value of Chinese and EU fisheries off West Africa is estimated. Given negative European perceptions of China’s growing engagement in West Africa, the study compares EU and Chinese agreements in terms of: a) illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; b) compensation amounts; and c) resource exploitation patterns.
Material and Methods
1. Catches of the EU and China
Industrial foreign catch data for West African EEZs (excluding Cameroon and Namibia post-2000s) from 1950–2010 were extracted using a bottom-up catch reconstruction approach. These are referred to as ‘reconstructed catches’. This method assumes that even unrecorded fisheries have a non-zero catch to cover operational costs. Reconstructed catches include legal (but unreported) and illegal (and unreported) components. Legal catches are defined as those under legal agreements, regardless of adherence to host country regulations.
Official (reported) catch data from FAO area 34 and 47 do not specify EEZs. To compare reconstructed data with official data, the Sea Around Us catch allocation approach was used to distribute FAO area catches to EEZs from 1950–2006, updated to 2010 assuming proportional spatial allocation. This allocation assumes unreported catches correlate with reported catches. Namibia was excluded as its catches were considered domestic post-independence. Reported and reconstructed catches were compared to analyze EU-West Africa and China-West Africa agreement performance.
2. Landed Value of West African Fisheries Operated by the EU and China
Landed value is calculated as the product of average ex-vessel price and landings (reported, unreported, illegal), using West African ex-vessel fish prices. This underestimates potential value by disregarding discards. By-catch landed by DWF, often flagged to West African countries, is included.
Reconstructed catch data and average ex-vessel prices (2005 USD per tonne) from Swartz et al. (2000–2010) were used to derive landed value. Prices were adjusted to 2013 USD using World Bank CPI data. Regional market ex-vessel prices enable landed value comparisons across countries, regardless of international market price variations. Landed value is the product of average 2013 USD ex-vessel prices and reconstructed catch in each EEZ. This analysis was conducted for both EU and Chinese catches (Table 1).
3. Agreement Value and Landed Value: EU vs. China
To compare landed catch value to EU and China compensation, average annual amounts received by West African countries (Table 1) for 2010 or the latest agreement prior to 2010 were derived.
EU FPA data were obtained from the EU law database (http://eur-lex.europa.eu). EU payments (Euro, including license and other fees) were converted to 2013 USD using 2010 exchange rates and CPI. The relevance of links to other trade arrangements was not considered unless explicitly stated in the agreement.
Chinese-West African agreements often involve joint ventures and reflagged vessels, even when intergovernmental. Agreements considered were inter-governmental, not company-level, excluding second-generation agreements. While some China-West Africa agreements are documented, amounts are often confidential or expressed as ‘project value’ (e.g., infrastructure projects) in exchange for fishing access. Project values were considered agreement values when direct evidence linked the project to fishing access. Project values were assessed based on media reports and economic news (S1 Table, S1 Materials). A transparent example is China’s $150 million USD payment to Morocco (1988-2002) for fishing access and joint ventures (Table 2). Chinese fees to Mauritania were less transparent, except for a recent agreement with $100 million USD compensation over 25 years. The low transparency of Chinese agreements might introduce bias.
Financial compensation paid by the EU and China was compared to the landed value of reported catches (“official compensation rate”) and total landed value based on reconstructed catches (“actual compensation rate”). The difference between these rates was estimated as the minimum economic loss for West African countries. This comparison required both EU and China agreements with a country and documented access payment amounts. In the absence of agreements, catches (excluding joint ventures or reflagged vessels) and their value were considered illegal. This quantified the fraction of landed value covered by EU and China agreements.
Results
1. Catches by Europe and China
Bottom-up estimations suggest average Chinese catches from West Africa were 2.3 million t·year-1 (2000-2010), about 20% lower than Pauly et al.’s midpoint estimate but within its 95% confidence interval. Excluding Namibia would further reduce this gap. This agreement between estimates from different methods is reassuring.
Chinese catches increased rapidly post-mid-1980s, including 1.4 million t·year-1 legal but unreported, 761,000 t·year-1 illegal/unregulated and unreported, 20,200 t·year-1 FAO-reported, and 159,000 t·year-1 reported as domestic but beneficially owned by China. Only 8% of total catches were officially reported as Chinese, consistent with Pauly et al. (2013). Under-reporting by China’s legal fleet was highest in the 1980s, decreasing over time but remaining high. Illegal Chinese catches increased from over 357,000 t·year-1 (1980s) to 761,000 t·year-1 (2000-2010) (Figure 2).
EU legal catches in West Africa were estimated at 155,000 t·year-1 (1950s), peaking at 3.5 million t·year-1 (mid-1970s), declining to 1.8 million t·year-1 (2000-2010), with only 524,000 t·year-1 officially FAO-reported (30%). Illegal EU catches increased to 404,000 t·year-1 (1970s), equaling Chinese illegal catches in the early 1980s, then decreasing to 224,000 t·year-1 (2000-2010) (Figure 2).
European legal catches were prominent (3.2 million t·year-1, 1980s) before China’s West Africa entry, equaling Chinese legal catches in the early 2000s. The decline in EU catches and increase in Chinese catches (2000-2010) suggests a potential replacement of European by Chinese fleets. However, EU reflagging to West African countries (e.g., Senegal) is a more likely explanation for decreased European contribution to foreign catches. Chinese reflagging is more easily identified, while post-colonial EU-West Africa relations complicate distinguishing between reflagged and truly domestic fleets.
2. Landed Value of West African Fisheries
From 2000-2010, EU and Chinese fleets caught fish worth $8.3 billion USD in West Africa (EU: $3.7 billion, China: $4.7 billion) (Table 3). Most value originated from Morocco/Western Sahara (68%). Of EU’s $3.7 billion, 4% was illegal ($0.2 billion), while $1.7 billion of China’s $4.7 billion was illegal (40%). Over 90% of legal EU landed value was from Morocco, Mauritania, Cape Verde, and Guinea. Illegal EU value was mainly from Mauritania, Senegal, and Liberia (Table 3). Over 96% of legal Chinese landed value was from Morocco/Western Sahara, Mauritania, Angola, Cape Verde, and Congo (Brazzaville). 87% of illegal Chinese value was concentrated around Morocco, Nigeria, and Mauritania (Table 3).
3. Agreements Value and Landed Value: Europe vs. China
European fishing agreements and equity
Europe paid $307 million USD·year-1 for West African access (2000-2010) (Table 3). Highest fees were to Morocco ($180 million·year-1) and Mauritania ($95 million·year-1), followed by Senegal and Angola. Official EU compensation (access value/reported landings value) was 26% (Table 3). Actual compensation (access value/total landed value) was lower, averaging 8% (Table 3), ranging from 0% (no agreements, e.g., Benin, Sierra Leone, Togo, Liberia, Ghana) to 23% (Mauritania, Table 3).
EU-Morocco FPA compensation is high ($180 million USD, Table 3) but only 7% of actual landed value (Table 3). Regional disparity exists: Morocco represents 28% of catches and 59% of fees, while Mauritania has a third of catches but 30% of fees. EU pays Morocco ~$345 USD·t-1 and Mauritania ~$154 USD·t-1.
Chinese fishing agreements and equity
Estimating Chinese access fees involved detailed investigation of media and news reports (S1 Table, S1 Materials). Chinese agreement transparency is poor. Not all payments were identified, even with agreement evidence (Table 3). Separating fisheries-specific payments from other sectors was also challenging, potentially biasing results upwards.
Chinese access fees (S1 Results and Discussion) were categorized:
Estimated average Chinese access fees were $166 million USD·year-1 (2000-2010) (Table 3). However, not all fees were available due to low transparency. Official Chinese compensation rate was estimated at 40%, while actual compensation rate was 4% (adjusted for undocumented access fees, Table 3). Actual Chinese compensation (4%) is half the EU rate (8%) (Table 3). Regional variation exists: Morocco agreement value was 5% of total, catches 26%, translating to ~$15 USD·t-1, compared to ~$121 USD·t-1 paid to Mauritania.
Excluding potentially non-fisheries-related projects (~$15 million USD·year-1), Chinese compensation would decrease to 3%. However, high variance in mean compensation rates for EU and China means they are not statistically different (t-test, p = 0.05).
Discussion
This study reveals increasing under-reporting of catches by the EU from West African waters, while Chinese under-reporting, though higher, might be decreasing, possibly due to increased reflagging of Chinese fleets. Reflagging can lead to lower compensation rates as “domestic vessels” often pay reduced fees.
Under-reporting masks overfishing and harms local economies and sustainability. For example, EU catches from Morocco/Western Sahara increased 5% post-1995 despite a 40% quota reduction agreement. Foreign fleets threaten long-term stock sustainability and hinder domestic fisheries development. Mauritania, for instance, excluded octopus from the new EU-Mauritania FPA, supposedly reserved for ‘domestic’ fisheries, which include reflagged Chinese and European vessels. Under-valued catches, weak bargaining power, and agreement secrecy contribute to financial discrepancies, particularly for China, with reflagging minimizing license fees.
Landed value from EU and Chinese fleets ($8.4 billion USD·year-1) excludes added value (processing, marketing), which could increase it by ~40% to $11.8 billion USD·year-1. This is equivalent to the average net development assistance received by West African countries (2000-2010). The difference between landed values and payments to West Africa represents a small proportion of the total economic loss. West African governments earned ~$0.5 billion (6%), excluding local landing, processing, and employment value, which is relatively low.
Other issues worsen the situation. Bribing for resource access leads to ecological and human rights abuses, as resource-dependent countries are more prone to corruption in resource sales. Sustainability-wise, agreements under UNCLOS are justified by the difference between domestic catches and sustainable catch potential. However, concerns arise when this surplus is exceeded. UNCLOS also mandates that agreements should not harm local development and livelihoods.
Chinese project-based compensation, while potentially strategic for corrupt countries, may be lower than EU cash payments and linked to higher under-reporting. However, regional variations show China with higher compensation rates than the EU in some countries, making overall rates statistically similar. Both EU and China compensation rates are likely low.
While Chinese agreements are often opaque, China’s performance in under-reporting and illegal practices is similar to the EU. Foreign fishing overexploits stocks, harms local communities’ income and nutrition, and imports overcapacity. This has led to Senegalese fishers fishing illegally in Mauritania, Guinean fishers facing increased costs, and Mauritania enforcing octopus fishing closures for artisanal fishers. Negative impacts extend beyond socio-economics to fish stocks, causing decreased fish size and catch per unit effort, and ‘importing’ stock depletion.
While Chinese agreements may be strategically beneficial for economic development, they often lack financial support for monitoring, surveillance, and scientific research. The EU emphasizes monitoring and surveillance but underpays related fees. Both contribute to illegal fishing, with EU and Chinese vessels involved.
Recommendations for fairer, more transparent access agreements and fisheries sustainability include: “Monitoring the Monitor” to ensure monitoring fees are properly used; increased agreement transparency to foster competition and higher fees; regional agreements to enhance West African bargaining power; regional regulatory responsibilities and enforcement of MSC agreements (e.g., right of pursuit); a registry of reflagging/FoC vessels for transparency; and shifting from GRT-based resource allocation to species quotas. Fishing access agreement funds should be dedicated to enforcement, scientific research, and training.
While the EU prioritizes rebuilding fish stocks in its waters, DWF expansion has led to overfishing in West Africa. Both the EU and China should act more responsibly, implementing sanctions for observer denial or quota overfishing. Efforts should focus on enforcing existing agreement measures (e.g., gear restrictions, quota limits) and capacity building in African countries, particularly for MCS.
Development-focused African countries should prioritize access to operators who offload catches locally to enable value-added processing and marketing.
Limitations include the study’s inability to fully document negotiation conditions and potential exclusion of some Chinese access fees due to difficulty separating fishing-specific components. Further research should compare non-monetary agreement aspects like MCS, scientific research support, sustainability clauses, and implementation. Further investigation into Chinese fees is needed to reduce bias.
Supporting Information
S1 Materials. Materials and methods for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000–2010.
S1 References. Other references used in S1 Table for the assessment of the fees paid by China for access to the EEZs of West African countries.
S1 Results and Discussion. Results and main findings summarized from the assessment presented in S1 Table.
S1 Table. Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000–2010.
Acknowledgments
This work was a contribution of the Sea Around Us project, funded by the MAVA Foundation, The Pew Charitable Trusts, and the Paul G. Allen Family Foundation. We thank Frederic Le Manach, Dr. Wilf Swartz, and colleagues from African institutions for their contributions.
Author Contributions
DB, VWYL, PLB, and DP conceived and designed the experiments. DB performed the experiments and analyzed the data. DZ, URS, PLB, EAK, and DP contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools. DB and DP wrote the paper.
